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Article 9

MAKING A CASE FOR AN AGE-SENSITIVE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TEST
I. INTRODUCTION

The Milford Central School District opened its school
building after normal school sessions to use by the community
for activities related to "instruction in any branch of education,
learning or the arts" and for "social, civic and recreational
meetings and entertainment events, and other uses pertaining
to the welfare of the community." 1 This community use policy
was developed pursuant to New York Education Laws § 414,
which gives local school boards the authority to "adopt
reasonable regulations" governing the use of school property for
public purposes. 2 The Milford community use policy also
contained the restriction that school property could not be used
for religious purposes. 3
The Good News Club, a group whose self-proclaimed
purpose is to "instruct children in family values and morals
from a Christian perspective,"4 sought permission to hold their
weekly meetings in the Milford Central School building after
the close of the regular school day. 5 The Club previously met at
the Milford Center Community Bible Church, and the Milford
School District provided students with bus transportation to
the meetings. The district had, however, discontinued the bus
1. The Good News Club v. Milford C. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102 (2001).
2. N.Y. Educ. Laws § 414 (McKinney 2000).
3. Good News, 533 U.S. 98, 102. New York Education Laws§ 414 lists specific
uses to which school facilities may be put, although it does not specifically include or
exclude use of the buildings by religious organizations or for religious purposes. The
statute mentions religion in two contexts, stating that admission fees charged for
activities occurring in the school building may not benefit religious organizations and
that graduation exercises held by the school may not include a religious service. The
validity of the use policy exclusion of religious use was not an issue in this case,
although an argument could be made that such a restriction was not authorized by the
statute.
4. The Good News Club v. Milford C. Sch., 21 F. Supp. 2d 147, 149 (N.D.N.Y
1998).
5. Id.
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service in 1996. 6
The interim superintendent denied the Club's request to
use the school building on the ground that the content of club
meetings was "the equivalent of religious worship."7 In arriving
at this characterization of the Club's activities, the
superintendent relied on materials provided by the Club that
were used in teaching lessons at Club meetings. 8 The Milford
school board later upheld the superintendent's decision. 9 The
Club brought suit, alleging that the school board's refusal to
allow them use of the building infringed upon their free speech
10
rights. The district court granted summary judgment for
Milford, finding that the Club engaged in religious instruction
and that the proposed use was therefore in violation of the use
policy. 11 The Second Circuit affirmed; 12 the Club appealed, and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 13
In a six to three decision, the Supreme Court held that
Milford violated Club members' free speech rights by denying
them access to the school building after regular school
sessions. 14 The Court reasoned that while Milford had
established a limited public forum from which some forms of
speech might be excluded, speech could not be barred from the
forum solely on the basis of its viewpoint. 15 The Court held that
6. /d.

7. Good News, 533 U.S. at 103.
8. The Good News Club v. Milford C. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 507 (2d. Cir. 2000). An
excerpt, included in the district court's opinion is characteristic of the nature of these
materials. In one lesson, outlined in a guide for teachers, children are to be instructed
that "If you have received the Lord Jesus as your Saviour from sin, you belong to God's
special group - His family.... If you obey God, you'll not be ashamed when the Lord
Jesus comes .... Just as the Lord Jesus rose again from the dead, those who believe in
Him will also be raised from their graves. If you should die before the Lord Jesus comes
again, your body will be placed in a grave. But when he gives the signal, your body will
be raised from the grave; it will be changed into a body like that of the Lord Jesus; and
you will be caught up to meet Him in the air.... When you tell someone of the Lord
Jesus and he receives Him as Saviour from sin, both of you are made glad. If a person
does not receive the Lord Jesus as Saviour, he will not be able to go to Heaven." Good
News, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 155-56.
9. Good News, 533 U.S. at 103.
10. Id. The Club initially also made arguments under Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, but the Court
only considered the free speech issue. !d. at 98.
11. Good News, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 160.
12. Good News, 202 F.3d at 504.
13. Good News, 533 U.S. at 98.
14. Id. at 102.
15. Id. at 107.
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by denying the Club access to the school building, Milford
engaged in viewpoint discrimination because it allowed other
groups that addressed the social and moral development of
children to meet in the building. 16 The Court also rejected
Milford's Establishment Clause defense, stating that Milford
could not legitimately argue that allowing the Club to meet in
the school building would lead to the perception that the school
endorsed the Club's activities or that the community would feel
coerced to participate in them. 17 In coming to this decision, the
Court rejected the argument that the age of the children
involved required special consideration of the Establishment
Clause issue. 18
The purpose of this article is to show that the Court should
have considered the age of the children involved in this case in
determining whether permitting the Club to meet in the school
would violate the Establishment Clause and to propose a test
that would allow the Court to make an age sensitive
determination without deviating from established precedent.
Part II gives an overview of recent cases considering
Establishment Clause challenges to a religious presence in
public schools to highlight the factors the Court has used in
deciding these cases. Part III briefly reviews free speech
jurisprudence in public schools as an example of an area of
constitutional interpretation where the Court has considered
the age of schoolchildren in determining the scope of a
constitutional right. Part IV proffers arguments that the Court
should consider the age of the audience of a religious message
in Establishment Clause cases, both from dicta in previous
cases and from the various amicus briefs submitted in support
of Milford. Part V outlines an age-sensitive Establishment
Clause test for use in public school cases.

II. CURRENT STATE OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE

The Supreme Court has consistently struggled with
Establishment Clause cases. 19 The Court has developed a
16.
17.
18.
19.
Courts,

ld. at 111.
ld. at 113-114.
ld. at 114-115.
See Ronna G. Schneider, Getting Help with Their Homework: Schools, Lower
and the Supreme Court Justices Look for Answers Under the Establishment

260

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2003

number of tests in deciding these cases, and the individual
justices have widely varying opinions as to how Establishment
Clause challenges to state action should be decided. 20 The most
concrete Establishment Clause test was constructed by the
court in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 21 The Lemon test outlined three
factors to use in determining whether government action
constituted an impermissible establishment of religion. A
violation was found if: (1) the action did not have a secular
purpose, (2) the action had a primary effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion, and (3) the action involved excessive
government entanglement with religion. 22 The Court has since
strayed from Lemon without officially overruling it, leaving
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in a mild state of
confusion. 23
A.

Board of Education v. Mergens 24

In 1990, in Board of Education v. Mergens, the Court,
relying solely on the Lemon test, denied a school's
Establishment Clause defense. The Court considered a

Clause, 53 Admin. L. Rev. 943, 943-44 (2001) ("Yet the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, at least in the last two decades, has lacked clarity, certainty, and
consistency. The Court's last decision of the century and the first three decisions of the
new millennium illustrate this judicial dissention. An analysis of those four Supreme
Court decisions, as well as the lower court decisions that have subsequently grappled
with Establishment Clause issues in the school context reflect the Court's sometimes
shifting, and usually divided, Establishment Clause jurisprudence."); Lisa
Langendorfer, Comment, Establishing a Pattern: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 33 U. Rich. L. Rev. 705, 705 (1999) ("The
Establishment Clause has been greatly litigated, with more than seventy cases decided
by the United States Supreme Court since the 1940s, yet the Court has been unable to
agree for any amount of time on a standard method for determining if the
Establishment Clause has been violated.").
20. Schneider, supra n. 19 at 956-57 (discussing the various positions of the
Justices on Establishment Clause issues); Langendorfer, supra n. 19 (outlining the
tests used in Establishment Clause cases and explaining the perspective of each
current justice on this issue); Penny J. Meyers, Note, Lemon is Alive and Kicking:
Using the Lemon Test to Determine the Constitutionality of Prayer at High School
Graduation Ceremonies, 34 Val. U. L. Rev. 231 (1999) (reviewing the various tests used
in Establishment Clause cases).
21. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
22. Id. at 612-13.
23. Schneider, supra n. 19, at 960-95 (analyzing lower courts' struggle to apply
the Court's inconsistent Establishment Clause precedent); Langendorfer, supra n. 19,
at 709-10 (discussing the Court's failure to use the Lemon test consistently).
24. 496 u.s. 226 (1990).
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challenge to the Equal Access Act, 25 which prohibits public
secondary schools that receive federal funding from denying
access to a limited public forum by student groups based on the
content of the speech expressed at their meetings. 26 The Court
found that each of the factors of the Lemon test were met and
subsequently rejected the school's Establishment Clause
argument. 27 The Court concluded that the Act's purpose of
preventing discrimination on the basis of speech was a
sufficient secular purpose. 28 In determining whether the Act
had a primary effect of advancing religion, the Court
considered whether there was a risk that students in the school
would perceive government endorsement of religion by allowing
such groups to hold meetings in the building. 29 The Court held
that high school students were mature enough to understand
that schools "do not endorse everything they fail to censor" and
that the Act's requirement that school officials not participate
in religious group meetings obviated any further risk that
30
students would perceive endorsement. The Court also held
that having a faculty member oversee meetings for
administrative purposes did not amount to excessive
government entanglement with religion. 31
B.

Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District32

The Court's analysis in Lamb's Chapel presents a move
away from the Lemon test. Lamb's Chapel applied to use school
facilities to show a film series offering a religious perspective
on child-rearing and other family issues. 33 The school district
denied the request because of the religious content of the
films. 34 The district argued on appeal that allowing the films to

25. 20 u.s.c. § 4071 (2001).
26. 20 U.S. C. § 4071(a) (2001).
27. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248-49.
28. I d.
29. Id. at 250.
30. Id. at 250-51.
31. ld. at 253.
32. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
33. ld. at 388.
34. ld at 389. The school district had adopted a community use policy that
prohibited use of school facilities "by any group for religious purposes," pursuant to
state law. Id. at 387.

262

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2003

be shown in the school would violate the Establishment
Clause. 35
In rejecting the Establishment Clause justification for
denying Lamb's Chapel access to the school facilities, the Court
referred to the Lemon test and held that the state action in this
case was permissible. 36 The Court did not engage in an in-depth
application of the Lemon factors to the facts of this case but
simply referred to the test and stated that it rendered the
district's action impermissible. 37 The Court instead focused on
why there was no danger of the community perceiving
government endorsement of religion if the school allowed the
film series to be presented by the church. 38 Because the films
were to be shown after school hours and would have been open
to the public, and considering that the building had been used
for other community purposes, the Court reasoned that
perception of endorsement was not a reasonable fear in this
case. 39 The Court also stated that any benefit to religion "would
have been no more than incidental."40
While the majority in this decision seemed to silently
discredit Lemon, Justice Scalia's concurrence directly voiced his
dissatisfaction with the Lemon test. In his concurring opinion,
Scalia harshly criticized the majority for using the Lemon test,
arguing that six of the nine justices had rejected the test in
previous cases. 41 He accused the Court of arbitrarily applying
Lemon to regulate government action. 42

35. !d. at 395.
36. !d.
37. !d.
38. !d. (In considering endorsement, the Court relied on its opinion in Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272 (1981), where the Court stated that the challenged
government activities did not "endorse or promote any of the particular ideas aired
there.") The Widmar Court did, however, base its decision on the Lemon test. Id. at
271.
39. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395.
40. !d.
41. !d. at 398 ("As to the Court's invocation of the Lemon test: Like some ghoul in
a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after
being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys of Center
Moriches Union Free School District.").
42. !d. at 399.
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C.

Rosenberger v. TheUniversity o{Virginia43

Following the Court's lukewarm treatment of the Lemon
test in Lamb's Chapel, its decision in Rosenberger marked a
further departure from this precedent. In this case, student
editors of a religious magazine brought suit against the
University for refusing to fund the publication, alleging, inter
alia, that refusal based on the content of the magazine violated
their free speech and press rights. 44 The University defended its
action as necessary to avoid violating the Establishment
45
Clause.
In rejecting the University's argument, the Court omitted
any direct reference to Lemon, focusing instead on the concept
of neutrality and stating that a government program that is
neutral towards religion will not violate the Establishment
Clause. 46 The Court determined that a government program
that extends benefits to all groups, regardless of religious
content or perspective, ensures the desired neutrality. 47 The
Court alluded to some of the Lemon factors, stating that a court
must determine the purpose of the action48 and must consider
the effects of the action, although the effects inquiry was
framed in terms of perception of endorsement. 49 While the
Court briefly mentioned these other considerations, the holding
was based on the neutrality concern. 50
D.

Good News 51

By the time the Court heard Good News, there was no clear
method for deciding Establishment Clause cases challenging
religious group access to public schools. The Court seemed to

43. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
44. ld. at 827. The group also argued that the University's actions violated their
free exercise of religion and created an equal protection problem. Id.
45. ld. at 828.
46. Id. at 839.
47. I d.
48. ld. at 838-39.
49. ld. at 841-42.
50. ld. at 845-6. ("The neutrality commanded of the State by the separate
Clauses of the First Amendment was compromised by the University's course of
action .... That course of action was a denial of the right of free speech and would risk
fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to religion, which could undermine the very
neutrality the Establishment Clause requires.").
51. Good News, 533 U.S. 98.
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have taken Justice Scalia's admonitions in Lamb's Chapel to
heart and implicitly put the Lemon test to rest in Rosenberger.
Lamb's Chapel emphasized the importance of limiting any
perception of government endorsement of a religious message
in schools while Rosenberger added the element of government
neutrality towards religion.
In Good News, the Court's
application of both factors led to its conclusion that allowing
the Good News Club (hereinafter "Club") to meet in the school
building did not violate the Establishment Clause.
1. Neutrality

The Court flatly rejected any suggestion that Milford's
refusal to allow the Club access to the school met the neutrality
requirement. 52 In fact, the Court expressed concern that the
community would perceive government hostility towards
religion if the school district was allowed to prohibit the Club
from using school facilities for its meetings. 53 While the Court
did not expressly label it as such, this concern is related to
neutrality. Because other groups were permitted to use the
school building according to the community use policy, the
Court found that reasonable members of the public could
interpret a prohibition of religious groups as an expression of
government hostility toward such groups. 54
2. Endorsement
The Court's consideration of the endorsement issue in Good
News had two components: (1) the risk of perception of school
endorsement and (2) a corresponding risk that the community
would subsequently feel coerced to participate in the religious
activities. 55 The Court considered the coercion issue first and
decided that the relevant audience for its inquiry was the
parents of the elementary school children, because the children
needed their parents' permission to attend Club meetings. 56
52. ld. at 114 ("The Good News Club seeks nothing more than to be treated
neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other groups. Because
allowing the Club to speak on school grounds would ensure neutrality, not threaten it,
Milford faces an uphill battle in arguing that the Establishment Clause compels it to
exclude the Good News Club.").
53. Id. at 118.
54. Id.
55. ld. at 114-15.
56. Id. at 115.
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The Court concluded that it was not reasonable to argue that
the parents of Milford school children would believe that the
school supported the religious message of the Club. 57 The Court
then stated that the need for parental permission obviated any
risk that the children would be coerced into participating in
Club activities. 58 The Court reasoned that the children could
not be coerced because their parents would not be confused
about endorsement.
Mter deciding that the parents were the only relevant
audience, the Court went on to address the argument that the
children themselves would perceive school sponsorship of the
Club. 59 The Court found that there were insufficient facts to
demonstrate that children attending the school would be
affected by the presence of the Club. 60 The Court concluded its
Establishment Clause discussion on a harsh note, stating that
even if there was a risk that the children would perceive
endorsement, this would not be sufficient to uphold Milford's
rejection of the Club: "We decline to employ Establishment
Clause jurisprudence using a modified heckler's veto, in which
a group's religious activity can be proscribed on the basis of
what the youngest members of the audience might
misperceive. "61
While the Court repeatedly asserted that the decisions in
Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger compelled the holding in Good
News, 62 the facts of these previous cases are distinguishable.
The Court could reasonably have held that Milford's actions
were .justified without calling into question the continued

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. ld. at 117-18.

60. Id. (The Court's reasoning for this assertion is somewhat confusing. This
section addresses both children who would be Club members and those who just attend
the regular sessions of the school but doesn't clearly differentiate between the two in
describing what facts control. "There is no evidence that young children are permitted
to loiter outside classrooms after the school day has ended. Surely even young children
are aware of events for which their parents must sign permission forms. The meetings
were held in a combined high school resource room and middle school special education
room, not in an elementary school classroom. The instructors are not schoolteachers.
And the children in the group are not all the same age as in the normal classroom
setting; their ages range from six to twelve.").
61. ld.
62. Id. at 107 (in the context of viewpoint discrimination), 113-16 (in the context
of the Establishment Clause).
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viability of these cases. 63 The Court could have used this case
as an opportunity to clean up Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and create a test for use in public school cases
that would offer guidance to lower courts and local school
boards.
E. A New Approach

The Supreme Court has attempted to develop one test for
use in all Establishment Clause cases. The Lemon test,
although the most organized of these attempts, has proved
insufficient for general use, as evidenced by the Court's
selective use of its factors. 64 In recent Establishment Clause
cases, the Court has, in effect, used different tests for different
kinds of cases without acknowledging or providing a coherent
explanation for its reasons for doing so, as the previous
discussion of relevant cases suggests. 65
In her concurrence in Board of Education v. Grumet, 66
Justice O'Connor recognized the Court's unwillingness to use
Lemon in all circumstances and its struggle to compose a

63. The challenged religious activity in Lamb's Chapel was to take place in the
evening and was intended for adults, not the children who attended the school. Lamb's
Chapel u. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381, 384 (2d Cir. 1992). This is
distinguishable from Milford, where the Good News Club sought access to the children
themselves. Rosenberger can easily be distinguished on the facts because it dealt with a
college, rather than an elementary school. The students were much older and the
religious presence was introduced by members of the college community, rather than
an outside religious organization, as was the case in Milford. The Court in Rosenberger
also had to consider the effects of their decision on freedom of the press, as the activity
in question was the publication of a student newspaper. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835.
64. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Over the years,
however, no fewer than five of the currently sitting Justices have, in their own
opinions, personally driven pencils through the creature's [the Lemon test] heart...
and a sixth has joined an opinion doing so ... when we wish to strike down a practice it
forbids, we invoke it. . . when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it
entirely."); see e.g. Schneider, supra n. 19, 944-45 (describing how Justice O'Connor
adjusted the prongs of the Lemon test in deciding Agostini u. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997)).
65. See e.g. William F. Cox, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause
and its Application to Education, 13 Regent U. L. Rev. 111, 122 (2000-2001) ("A
uniform standard for interpreting the Establishment Clause has escaped the Supreme
Court. Sometimes, for instance, parochial institutions and/or attendees are denied
monies or resources because they foster religious orientation. At other times, similar
resources are allowed for parochial institutions because to instill safeguards to keep
the resources pointed in a secular direction constitutes excessive entanglement with
religion that is equally unconstitutional.").
66. 512 u.s. 687 (1994).
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singular test for use in Establishment Clause cases. 67 She
warned that attempting to stretch one rule to accommodate all
Establishment Clause cases may have negative effects on this
jurisprudence: "And setting forth a unitary test for a broad set
of cases may sometimes do more harm than good. Any test that
must deal with widely disparate situations risks being so vague
as to be useless." 68 O'Connor argued that the Court should be
willing to develop different tests for different kinds of
Establishment Clause cases:
But the same constitutional principal may operate very
differently in different contexts. We have, for instance,
no one Free Speech Clause test. We have different tests
for content-based speech restrictions, for contentneutral speech restrictions, for restrictions imposed by
the government acting as employer, for restrictions in
nonpublic fora, and so on. This simply reflects the
necessary recognition that the interests relevant to the
Free Speech Clause inquiry - personal liberty, an
informed citizenry, government efficiency, public order,
and so on - are present in different degrees in each
context. 69
The Court should look to First Amendment jurisprudence
for guidance in establishing a new Establishment Clause
approach. As Justice O'Connor noted, the area of free speech is
one in which the Court has developed multiple tests for
determining whether the government has violated individual
rights. This is also an area where the Court has considered the
age of the audience of a particular message in determining
whether the speaker should be able to express their message in
a given forum. 70 The next section of this paper briefly reviews
free speech jurisprudence in public school cases as an example
of how the Court could approach the Establishment Clause.
III. FREE SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
The quintessential student speech case is Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District, decided in
67. ld. at 718 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
68. ld.
69. ld.
70. See infra Part III (discussing free speech cases where the Court considers the
age of the audience).
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1969. 71 In this case, a handful of students wore black armbands
to school to show their objection to the Vietnam War. 72 The
principal of the school learned of the plan to wear the
armbands and adopted a school policy that any student
wearing one would be suspended until he or she returned to
school without it. 73 The students in this case wore the
armbands despite the policy and were suspended from school
for almost a month. 74 The students brought suit challenging
this policy on the ground that it violated their right to free
speech. 75
The Supreme Court recognized the students' First
Amendment right to free speech and found the school policy to
76
The Court's reasoning can be
be unconstitutional.
summarized in the oft-cited quote: "It can hardly be argued
that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.'m
Tlie Court further stated that such a stifling of student speech
or expression can only be justified where the school
administrators have reason to think that such speech would
"materially and substantially interfere with the requirements
of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school."78
Since deciding Tinker, the Court has qualified the right of
students to uninhibited speech in public schools. In two
subsequent cases, the Court upheld restrictions on student
speech, largely due to concerns for the younger members of the
audience.

A.

Bethel School District v. Fraser79

In Bethel School District v. Fraser, the Court recognized
that the age of an audience was an essential consideration in
situations where a student's right to free speech was asserted.
Matthew Fraser, a high school student, made a speech
nominating one of his friends as a candidate for student
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Id. at 504.
ld.
ld.
Id.
ld. at 514.
ld. at 506.
Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)).
478 u.s. 675 (1986).
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government at an assembly that all students were required to
attend. 80 He was later suspended because school administrators
considered his speech to be obscene, therefore violating a
disciplinary rule prohibiting the use of obscene or profane
language. 81 Fraser brought suit challenging his suspension,
arguing that the school's action violated his right to freedom of
speech. 82
The Court upheld the school's disciplinary action. 83
Acknowledging that Tinker protected student speech, the Court
also recognized that "the constitutional rights of students in
public schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights
of adults in other settings."84 The Court asserted that school
officials have the authority to prohibit or punish speech that
"would undermine the school's basic educational mission."85 In
support of its holding, the Court referred to a number of cases
where it limited First Amendment rights in order to protect
children from sexually explicit speech. 86 In deciding Fraser, the
Court emphasized the potentially negative effects of Fraser's
speech on the younger students in attendance: "The speech
could well be seriously damaging to its less mature audience,
many of whom were only fourteen years old and on the
threshold of awareness of human sexuality."87
The Fraser Court also recognized the school's role as
protector of children when acting in loco parentis. 88 Considering
the advisability of judicial intervention in these cases, the
Court stated that the school board is the most appropriate body
to make decisions concerning whether certain types of speech
are acceptable in public schools. 89
80. I d. at 677.
81. Id. at 678.
82. I d. at 679.
83. I d. at 685.
84. I d. at 682 (citing New Jersey u. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-42 (1985)).
85. Id. at 685.
86. Id. at 684-85. (referring to Ginsberg u. N.Y., 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding a
statute banning the sale of sexually explicit material to minors); Bd. of Educ. u. Pico,
457 U.S. 853 (1982) (allowing a school board to remove books from a school library that
are "vulgar"); F.C.C. u. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (rejecting the argument
that a radio station has a right to broadcast vulgarity and giving weight to the fact that
the specific broadcast in question was aired at a time when children would be
listening).).
87. Id. at 683.
88. Id. at 684.
89. Id. at 683.
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Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier90

In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court took
Fraser one step further, allowing school officials to prohibit
certain kinds of speech in student newspapers. 91 Here, the
school principal decided that two articles intended for
publication in the paper were inappropriate and ordered them
removed. 92 The Court relied heavily on Fraser's reasoning in
upholding the principal's action, again emphasizing that
educational decisions are the responsibility of local
communities, not federal judges, 93 and expressing concern that
the material was not appropriate for a less mature audience. 94
This consideration of the maturity of the audience of the
articles was even extended to potential readers who did not
attend the school, such as younger brothers and sisters. 95 The
Court also expressed an endorsement concern:
Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over
this ... form of student expression [student publications]
to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the
activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners
are not exposed to materials that may be inappropriate
for their level of maturity, and that the views of the
individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the
school. 96
C. Analysis

A review of these free speech cases shows that the Supreme
Court is willing to consider the age of an audience in
determining the scope of a speaker's right to free expression.
Where particular forms of speech may disrupt the school

90. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
91. Id. at 276.
92. Id. at 264. One article described three students' experiences with pregnancy
and the principal was concerned both that the identity of these students would be
obvious from the context of the story and that the material was inappropriate for
younger students. The other article described one student's experience with divorce,
and the principal concluded that the story unfairly portrayed one of the parents
without allowing either parent to respond to the story or to consent to its publication.
Id. at 263.
93. ld. at 273.
94. Id. at 271.
95. ld. at 274-275.
96. ld. at 271.
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environment or have negative effects on younger students, the
Court will limit the breadth of this fundamental First
Amendment right.
In light of this aspect of the Court's free speech
jurisprudence, its refusal to make a parallel inquiry in the
Establishment Clause context appears disingenuous. As
discussed earlier, the Court, in Milford, refused to consider the
perspective of the children in order to prevent using a
"modified heckler's veto" where the possible misperceptions of
the youngest members of an audience mandated restriction of
the challenged activities. 97 Yet, this is exactly what the Court
has done in the free speech context. The cases above illustrate
that the Court is willing to censor speech for the sake of the
youngest ears that may hear it. The Court's refusal to do so in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence without distinguishing
these two areas of law is simply inconsistent.
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR CONSIDERATION OF AGE IN
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CASES

A. Previous Supreme Court Statements Considering Age in
Establishment Clause Cases

The suggestion that the Court consider the age of the
audience of a religious message when determining if there is an
Establishment Clause violation is not a new one. The Court
made statements to this effect in dicta in a number of recent
cases. In Edwards v. Aguillard, 98 the Court acknowledged that
there are special concerns when applying the Lemon test in the
context of an elementary or secondary schooV9 In other cases,
the Court addressed the age of the audience when considering
the specific elements of Establishment Clause inquiries:
endorsement, coercion, and neutrality.
97. See supra Part II.D.2 (discussing the Court's reasoning in Milford).
98. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
99. ld. at 583-84 ("The Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring
compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools.
Families entrust public schools with the education of their children, but condition their
trust on the understanding that the classroom will not purposely be used to advance
religious views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or her
family. Students in such institutions are impressionable and their attendance is
involuntary."). Edwards v. Aguillard was overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997), but this piece of dicta remains instructive.
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The Court has referenced age when determining whether
state action would create a perception of endorsement. In
considering whether there was a likelihood of perceived
endorsement of religion with a state program that provided
classes to nonpublic (mostly sectarian religious) school students
in the public schools, the Court specifically considered the age
of the children in attendance at the public school:
The inquiry into this kind of effect must be conducted
with particular care when many of the citizens
perceiving the governmental message are children in
their formative years. The symbolism of a union
between church and state is most likely to influence
children of tender years, whose experience is limited
and whose beliefs consequently are the function of
environment as much as of free and voluntary choice. 100
Additionally, in Mergens/ 01 the Court used the age of the
students to support the contention that there was no
reasonable concern that the students attending the high school
would perceive endorsement: "We think that secondary school
students are mature enough and are likely to understand that
a school does not endorse or support student speech that it
merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis."102
The Court also considered age relevant when determining
whether individuals would feel coerced by a state action
relating to religion. In Tilton v. Richardson 103 the Court stated
that college students "are less impressionable and less
susceptible to religious indoctrination." 104 The older age of an
audience was relied on again in Marsh v. Chambers 105 when a
state congressperson challenged the practice of opening each
legislative day with a prayer: "Here, the individual claiming
injury by the practice is an adult, presumably not readily
susceptible to religious indoctrination or peer pressure."106 In
both of these cases, the Court used the age of the audience to
support the holding that there was no Establishment Clause
violation. The Court concluded that the individuals in these
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Sch. Dist. of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985).
496 U.S. 226 (1990). See supra Part II.A. discussing Mergens.
!d. at 250.
403 U.S. 672 (1971).
!d. at 686.
463 u.s. 783, 792 (1983).
Id.
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cases were mature enough that they would not be easily
coerced by the activities of others.
The Court also used age in considering whether
government action was neutral toward religion. The Court used
age in Widmar u. Vincent to support their holding of no
Establishment Clause violation. This time when considering
the neutrality of a state policy, the Court noted: "[u]niversity
students are, of course, young adults. They are less
impressionable than younger students and should be able to
appreciate that the University's policy is one of neutrality
toward religion." 107
B.

Arguments of Amicus Curiae in Good News

A number of religious, civil liberties, and school
administration organizations submitted amicus briefs to the
Court in support of Milford's actions denying the Good News
Club access to the school facilities. Many of these organizations
argued that the age of the children in this case made such
action necessary to avoid violating the Establishment Clause
for two main reasons: (1) that young children are more
impressionable than high school and college students, and (2)
that Congress made age relevant when enacting the Equal
Access Act.
Some of these organizations cited psychological research
indicating that children age six to twelve are less cognitively
mature than older students and are therefore more likely to
perceive school endorsement of any activities that take place in
the school. 108 Psychologist Jean Piaget concluded that preadolescent children are not able to "think on an abstract logical
level, to reason by hypothesis, and to engage in independent
analysis." 109 Psychologist Eric Erikson found that a child of this
age "lacks the ability to make distinctions between his views,
others' views, and the views of his school."11° Children, being
107. 454 U.S. 263, 274 n. 14 (1981).
108. Brief of Amici Curiae Anti-Defamation League; Hadassah - The Women's
Zionist Organization of America, Inc.; National Coalition for Public Education and
Religious Liberty; and National Council of Jewish Women at 20-21, Good News (No.
99-2036); Brief of Amici Curiae Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
The American Civil Liberties Union, The American Jewish Committee, The New York
Civil Liberties Union, and People for the American Way Foundation at 14-15, Good
News (No. 99-2036).
109. Brief for Americans United for Separation of Church and State at 14.
110. Id. at 14-15.
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limited in their cognitive abilities, will not be able to appreciate
the difference between formal classroom instruction and
activities that take place after school in the same classrooms. 111
Such children are likely to perceive school endorsement of any
activities conducted in the school building.
Amici also cited psychological research indicating that preadolescent children are more susceptible to peer pressure than
older children. 112 The authors of one brief worry that "an
elementary school student faced with his or her peers
attending the Good News Club's meetings would very well feel
coerced by peer pressure to attend and to 'receive [Jesus
Christ] as [his or her] Savior."'113 This fear is not alleviated by
the requirement of parental permission because students not
allowed to attend Club meetings would feel "excluded,
different, and diminished within their own school." 114 While
there may be no coercion by school officials themselves to
participate in Club activities, the sociology of an elementary
school works to put this pressure on the students.
Amici also relied on the Equal Access Act115 to support their
arguments that the age of the children in this case created an
Establishment Clause concern. 116 The drafters of this Act
originally included elementary schools in its coverage but
ultimately limited its provisions to secondary schools after
widespread objections from members of Congress. 117 These
objections were based on a concern that young children "are
unable to appreciate the distinction between neutrality and
sponsorship, that they lack the maturity to undertake action
without school supervision and involvement, and that they are
particularly impressionable and subject to coercion and

111. There is some confusion over the facts of Good News as to what time the Club
sought to use the school building for its meetings. There is evidence that they
petitioned the school board to enter the building prior to the end of the school day so
that their meeting could begin directly after regular instruction ended. Good News, 21
F. Supp. 2d 147, 149 (1998).
112. Brief of Anti-Defamation League at 21.
113. ld. at 21-22.
114. ld. at 22.
115. See text accompanying supra n. 25.
116. Brief of Americans United for Church and State at 15; Brief of AntiDefamation League at 22-23; Brief of the American Jewish Congress at 29, Good News
(No. 99-2036); Brief of National School Boards Association, American Association of
School Administrators, Horace Mann League at 21, Good News (No. 99-2036).
117. Brief of Americans United for Church and State at 15.
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manipulation by others." 118 Amici referenced this Act as
evidence that Congress recognized that there are different
considerations in assessing potential Establishment Clause
violations when the audience of a religious message includes
young children and, in turn, argued that the judicial branch
should do the same.
V. AN-AGE SENSITIVE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE TEST

This section proposes a test for use in Establishment Clause
cases challenging religious activities in public schools. Under
this test, the Court must first determine the age range for the
intended audience of a religious message. If the audience is
pre-adolescent (generally younger than twelve) the Court
should consider the extent to which a perception of government
endorsement of religion is likely. If the audience is older than
twelve, the Court should determine if the school's position on
religious activities within the school is neutral toward
religion. 119 This test does not directly consider the elements of
the Lemon test because the Court itself has been hesitant to
use them; however, considerations of endorsement and
neutrality in this age-sensitive test are derived from Lemon. 120
The idea of separating the two inquiries is not a novel one.
In arguing that the Court should adopt multiple Establishment
Clause tests, Justice O'Connor suggested that some cases
require a consideration of endorsement, while others would be
better decided on neutrality, although not in the context of age,
as this article suggests is necessary. 121
118. ld. at 16 n. 8.
119. For this test to function efficiently, it is necessary to set a bright-line division
between the two categories of Establishment Clause inquiries. The age of twelve was
chosen because this tends to be the age where children move from the childish world of
elementary school into the more adult-like world of middle school or junior high. Using
the age of twelve essentially allows courts to use one inquiry for elementary schools
and one for schools that house the higher grades. I chose not to set the line at the level
of the school itself because some small school districts, like Milford, have only one
school building for all grades.
120. Langendorfer, supra n. 19 at 709 (discussing Justice O'Connor's revision of
the purpose and effects prongs of the Lemon test into the endorsement test) and at 716
(examining Justice Souter's use of neutrality to supplement the Lemon test).
121. Grumet, 512 U.S. at 720 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Some cases ... involve
government actions targeted at particular individuals or groups, imposing special
duties or giving special benefits. Cases involving government speech on religious
topics ... seem to me to fall into a different category and to require an analysis focusing
on whether the speech endorses or disapproves of religion, rather than on whether the
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Children Younger than Twelve

As discussed earlier, the Court has attempted to discern
Establishment Clause violations by considering whether school
actions may lead students to believe that the school supports or
endorses the religious activities occurring in the school. 122 This
fear of perceived endorsement has been discredited in cases
where the students are old enough to understand that a school
does not endorse all the activities that take place on school
groun ds. 123
It logically follows from the assertion that older students
will not perceive endorsement, that younger students will, or,
at least, might perceive it. The Court's reliance on the age and
maturity of students in cases like Mergens is empty without
recognition that the cases may have been decided differently if
the students had been younger. 124 It is inconsistent for the
Court to rely on age when the students are older and
cognitively mature but to ignore it when they are young and
potentially confused by a religious presence in their school.
Under the prescribed test, the Court would consider
whether average children under the age of twelve in a
particular situation would perceive official school endorsement
of religious activities occurring at the school. This would be a
context-based inquiry, looking at the children in a particular
school. The school board most properly makes the decision, and
the Court should afford such decisions great weight in
considering challenges to the school board's authority. 125
B.

Children Older than Twelve

Review of previous Supreme Court decisions indicates that
the Court is not convinced that older students will perceive
school endorsement of religion solely because religious
126
activities are permitted to take place on school property. In

government action is neutral with regard to religion.").
122. See supra Part II discussing Mergens and Lamb's Chapel.
123. See supra Part II.C. discussing Rosenberger.
124. See supra Part II.A. discussing Mergens. See e.g. Brief of Americans United
for Church and State at 14.
125. As stated earlier, the Court has long held that decisions regarding public
education should be made by the local communities and not by federal judges. See
supra Part liLA. discussing Fraser.
126. E.g. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250-51; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 n. 14.
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light of the psychological research finding that adolescent
children are more able to engage in abstract, higher order
thinking, the Court's position on this issue is reasonable. 127 In
Rosenberger, where the Court was confronted with an
Establishment Clause defense in the context of a state
university, it focused not on age, but on the government's
neutrality towards religion. 128 This neutrality inquiry makes
sense when the audience is composed of older students. Where
there is no reasonable fear of perceived school endorsement,
the government's priority should be to create policies that are
neutral toward religion.
Under the proposed test, if the intended audience is
composed of students older than twelve, the Court must
determine whether the school board's policy on extra-curricular
activities is neutral toward religion. An appropriate policy
would allow religious groups to meet in the school on the same
terms as other organizations. In many of the situations where
members of an intended audience are older than twelve, the
Equal Access Act would control, as this audience would be
129
composed of students at a secondary school.
C.

Applying the Test to Good News

The benefits of an age-sensitive Establishment Clause test
can most clearly be seen by considering how it would have
affected the outcome of Good News. Before addressing this
question, however, it must be remembered that the Court in
Good News considered the relevant audience to be the parents
of the schoolchildren, and not the children themselves. 130 This
represented a fundamental flaw in the Court's reasoning,
regardless of what test the Court used to evaluate the
Establishment Clause argument. The Club sought access to the
school in order to share its religious message with the children
in attendance. While parental permission was required for

127. See supra Part IV.B. discussing psychological research cited in amicus briefs.
128. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845-846.
129. See supra Part II.A with accompanying text and footnotes.
130. Good News, 533 U.S. at 115 ("[T]o the extent we consider whether the
community would feel coercive pressure to engage in the Club's activities, the relevant
community would be the parents, not the elementary school children. It is the parents
who choose whether their children will attend the Good News Club meetings. Because
the children cannot attend without their parents' permission, they cannot be coerced
into engaging in the Good News Club's religious activities.").
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students to attend Club meetings, the parents were not the
intended recipients of the religious message. The students of
the Milford Central School, both those who attended the Club
meetings and those who did not, represented the audience that
would be affected by the presence of the Club in the school. The
children would be aware that the Club met in the school
building and could potentially perceive official school
endorsement of the club's activities simply by virtue of its
presence in the school. Even though the children would know
that parental permission was required to attend the meetings,
they could still perceive endorsement because there are other
school activities that require parental permission that are
131
school endorsed. While it is not inappropriate for the Court to
consider the perspective of the parents of Milford school
children, the Court must also consider the perspective of the
intended audience of the religious message. In this case, that
audience is Milford school children, ages six to twelve. 132
Assuming that the Court chose the correct audience for its
Establishment Clause inquiry, under the test proposed in this
Article, the Court would then consider whether a reasonable
child between the ages of six and twelve would perceive school
endorsement of the Club's activities. This is a fact-based
inquiry, and many of the necessary facts were not part of the
record of this case as it came up as an appeal of the lower
court's grant of Defendant's motion for summary judgment. 133
The Court would have to remand this case for further factfinding. There are three basic sets of facts to consider: the other
clubs and organizations that were permitted to meet in the
school building, the format of the Club's meetings, and the time
the Club sought to use the building.
From the record it appears that only three other
organizations were permitted to meet in the school building:
the Boy Scouts, the Girl Scouts, and the 4-H Club. 134 This may
lead to an enhanced risk that the children would perceive
endorsement of the Good News Club's activities. The school

131. Brief for Americans United for Church and State at 22 ("A child who is sent
home with a permission slip [to attend Good News Club meetings], much like the one
his parents complete to allow him to participate in a school-sponsored field trip, is
likely to perceive this as the school's promotion of the event.").
132. Good News, 533 U.S. at 103.
133. Good News, 533 U.S. at 104.
134. Good News, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 154.
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established a limited public forum, and the record suggests
that this forum was not widely used by the community for nonschool related activities. It is likely that the children were
unaccustomed to adults entering the building for purposes
other than regular classroom instruction. It is also likely that
the younger students perceived that the other clubs using the
school for meetings were related to official school instruction,
because they thought of the school as being used solely for
school-related activities. While there are no constitutional
concerns with students perceiving endorsement of the 4-H
Club, perceived endorsement of a religious message violates the
Establishment Clause under this test.
If the facts indicated that the school building was used by a
number of community organizations for various purposes and
that the students were aware of these uses, the risk of student
perception of endorsement of each of these activities would
diminish. If the young students saw the school building being
frequently used for obviously nonschool-related activities, such
as dance classes or adult organization meetings, they would be
more likely to understand that not everything that happens in
the school building is part of the official curriculum. Justice
Marshall made a similar argument in his concurrence m
Mergens:
But the crucial question is how the [Equal Access] Act
affects each school. If a school already houses numerous
ideological organizations, then the addition of a religion
club will most likely not violate the Establishment
Clause because the risk that students will erroneously
attribute the views of the religion club to the school is
minimal. .. But if the religion club is the sole advocacyoriented group in the forum ... then the school's failure
to disassociate itself from the religious activity will
reasonably be understood as an endorsement of that
ac t 1v1'ty. }35
o

135. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 266 (Marshall, J., concurring). For a discussion offorum
domination by religious groups see Steven G. Gray, The No Religion Zone:
Constitutional Limitations on Religious Association in the Public Sphere, 85 Minn. L.
Rev. 1885, 1902-1903 (2001) ("Private religious domination of public forum is
problematic in a general way because it communicates to society that a particular
religious group has a favored status not shared by other religious groups [or
nonreligious individuals]. Furthermore, it is particularly problematic because it forces
nonadherents of the dominant religion to forego access to the forum to avoid
participating in the favored religion's sectarian activities.").
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While the issues in Mergens differ from Good News in that
Mergens deals with the Equal Access Act and a high school,
Marshall's sentiment remains relevant here. Where the wider
community routinely uses a school building for broad purposes,
students will be more likely to consider the building to be a
community institution where they attend classes and
sometimes go for other purposes. Although they may not be
able to engage in abstract thinking, 136 students will understand
the function of their school in the context in which they
experience it.
Another factual inquiry concerns the format of the Club
meetings. A number of amici argued that the Club was
structured too much like a regular class and that this would
contribute to a misunderstanding that the Club was part of
official school instruction. 137 The record contains a brief
description ofthe format of Club meetings:
The Club opens its session with Ms. Fournier taking
attendance. As she calls a child's name, if the child
recites a Bible verse the child receives a treat. After
attendance, the Club sings songs. Next Club members
engage in games that involve, inter alia, learning Bible
verses. Ms. Fournier then relates a Bible story and
explains how it applies to Club members' lives. The
Club closes with prayer. Finally, Ms. Fournier
distributes treats and Bible verses for memorization. 138
Again, however, the record would have to be developed further
in order to determine the extent to which the Club meetings
resemble normal classroom instruction.
The concern is that children would be more likely to
perceive endorsement if the Club meetings proceeded like
classes. If the meeting was conducted by a single individual
standing at the chalkboard while the children sat at desks in
rows, the children would be more likely to equate the Club
meeting with formal classroom instruction. If the Club meeting
varied from this traditional model of classroom learning, the
participants and observers would have an easier time
distinguishing the Club from school. This could be
accomplished by using multiple instructors, alternative seating
136. See supra Part IV. B. discussing psychological research cited in amicus briefs.
137. Brief of Americans United for Separation of Church and State at 26; Brief of
the American Jewish Congress at 25-26.
138. Good News, 533 U.S. at 103.
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arrangements, and encouraging behavior not customary m
traditional classrooms, like talking without raising hands or
walking around the room at will.
Perception of endorsement derived from the structure of
Club meetings is more likely to affect those students attending
the meeting than students who do not attend, but either hear
about the meetings second-hand or pass by the classroom and
look inside. This does not reduce the importance of this factual
inquiry into the format of club meetings. While children need
parental permission to attend the meetings, receipt of this
permission does not relax the school's constitutional obligations
to the students in attendance. Even if the perception of
endorsement of the club meeting has positive effects on the
children, the requirement that students not be confused as to
the school's role in the religious activities occurring within the
school building is a constant one that cannot be excused. A
related factual inquiry considers the time the Club requested to
use the building. This fact was not clear from the record in
Good News. If the Club met directly after regular school
sessions ended, children would be more likely to think that the
meeting was part of the curriculum. This was another concern
raised by the amici. 139 If students had to return home first and
then be driven back to the school by their parents, they would
be more likely to distinguish Club meetings from official
classroom instruction because ofthe lapse in time. 140
It is clear that the Court would have had to remand this
case in order to decide it using the age-sensitive test for
Establishment Clause violations. An argument was made that
the Court should have done so anyway. 141 But using this agesensitive test would have produced a result that was
reasonable for the Milford School District and the children
attending Milford Central School. If there were facts
legitimating the concern that the children would perceive
official school endorsement of the Club's activities and
message, the Club would have been forced to find an

139. Brief of Amercians United for Separation of Church and State at 17-19; Brief
of the American Jewish Congress at 24; Brief of Anti-Defamation League at 24-26;
Brief of the New York State School Board Association, Inc. at 10-11, Good News (No.
99-2036); Brief ofN ational School Boards Association at 17-18.
140. While this may be inconvenient for parents, it is not the responsibility of the
public school system to provide convenient access to religious instruction.
141. Good News, 533 U.S. at 140-141 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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alternative site for its meetings or adjust the format or timing
of their meetings to eliminate the potential for confusion. If the
facts indicated that the children in the school would not
reasonably perceive endorsement, the Club would then be
permitted to meet in the manner and time requested.

VI. CONCLUSION
The debate over what the Framers intended in drafting the
Establishment Clause began immediately after ratification of
the Constitution and has continued ever since. Some rely on
Thomas Jefferson's sentiment when he wrote in a letter that a
"wall of separation" should divide church and state. 142 Others
look to the tradition of religion in the founding of this country
and argue that the Framers could not have intended to restrict
all government aid to religion. 143 This debate is not one that can
be brought to the Supreme Court for a final adjudication.
Disputes over the appropriate relationship between religion
and government will likely continue indefinitely, regardless of
how the Court approaches the issue in individual cases.
The best the Court can do is to try to ensure that the
government "make[s] no law respecting an establishment of
religion." 144 At this point in history, exactly what this means in
any given situation is unclear. Recent Court decisions indicate
that government policies that create a perception of official
endorsement of religion or that are not neutral toward religion
violate this constitutional mandate, but the Court may change
its position on these policies in a future case. The fate of the
Lemon test shows that no test is invincible; but whatever
method the Court uses to decide these cases, it must
acknowledge that different concerns arise when the forum for a
religious message is a public elementary school and when the
audience of such a message includes young children. The Court
has recognized this in the context of free speech and has
allowed school administrators to censor student speech to the
extent necessary to preserve order and protect younger, less
mature students from the psychological harm that may result
142. J. Clifford Wallace, The Framers' Establishment Clause: How High the Wall?,
2001 BYU L. Rev. 755, 761 (2001).
143. See e.g. id.; Mark W. Cordes, Politics, Religion, and the First Amendment, 50
DePaul L. Rev. 111 (2000).
144. U.S. Const. amend. I.
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from being exposed to disruptive or inappropriate speech.
Educators need the same power to limit religious activities in
schools to ensure that all students feel that their religious
beliefs are respected, both by the school and the state.
Chelsea Chaffee

